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Review & Reply

On “Projecting Stability: A Deployable
NATO Police Command”
Raymond E. Bell Jr.
This commentary responds to Massimo Pani’s and Karen J. Finkenbinder’s article
“Projecting Stability: A Deployable NATO Police Command” published in the
Spring/Summer 2019 issue of Parameters (vol. 49, no. 1–2).

I

t will be interesting to see if a NATO Police Command will
mature from a theoretical force structure to one of reality as so
cogently argued by Massimo Pani and Karen J. Finkenbinder in
“Projecting Stability: A Deployable NATO Police Command.” As a
former brigade commander of the US Army Reserve 220th Military
Police Brigade, my interest is piqued, especially when thinking about
the manning of such a command.
I commend the authors for their forward thinking in developing
the rationale for such a command but feel they might have taken
their concept an additional step further and commented on
the “who” situation in more detail. They could have addressed
some of the personnel resources presently available, especially as
pertains to US contributions to a US stability policing brigade but
also to the other proposed necessary adjunct organizations and
staff sections.
If the command were to be organized just from within today’s
active duty US Army military police unit structure establishment,
a difficulty would arise. The authors noted, “the most notable
aspect that authorities and military commanders must understand
about building a stability police force is that large numbers of
novice police officers, swiftly equipped and hastily instructed, are
detrimental to the success of security and stabilization operations.”
This is a point well taken.
My experience was that the US Army Military Police Corps
commissions officers and enlists soldiers who are what I consider
the “cream of the crop.” Members must be capable of multitasking,
specifically, accomplishing various police-related functions with
professionalism. But by and large, the active duty corps does not
have a broad-based complement of professionally mature and
experienced personnel in its ranks.
The majority of the active duty, lower-ranking corps members
must be considered novice police officers, although considering
their high caliber, my evaluation is not to be construed as negative
or degrading. Today’s enlisted individual or officer with an active
duty commissioned or enlisted commitment simply does not have,
nor can be expected to have, the experience gained by extended
service in the corps.
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Dr. Finkenbinder clearly has military police experience and
is qualified to address the subject of effective manning. Her
curriculum vitae states she served as “a municipal police officer,
state police training and education specialist, and military police
officer.” I suspect that hidden within those words is that she was
not only on active duty service as a military police officer but also
in the Army Reserve or National Guard in some military police
capacity. If I am correct, then she fully appreciates from where
the law enforcement professional assets can come to man a NATO
police command outside the active duty Army force structure.
The law enforcement background of such Reserve component
police personnel can be phenomenal. But individuals with
other backgrounds related to combat, anti-criminal operations,
community service, legal work, business enterprise, civilian
government administration, and religious practice (to name a few)
have, as noted in the essay, a place in the manning mix. That mix
can be multicomponent.
In my brigade headquarters, for example, there were personnel
whose performance over a four-year period showed that the
integrated active duty Army, traditional Army Reserve, activated
Army Guard and Army Reserve, and military technician
combination of personnel worked harmoniously and effectively.
The traditional Army reservists in the brigade headquarters
consisted of those with active duty Army combat arms and military
police service in Vietnam, as well as those who were local and
regional full-time correctional and police officers, US Department
of Agriculture and US Department of State employees, college
professors, civilian military intelligence and Central Intelligence
Agency professionals, writers, Naval Criminal Investigative
Service investigators, lawyers, hospital administrators, and clergy.
Some had advanced degrees including doctorates. All these
personnel were experienced in their civilian capacities, which would
have contributed effectively to mission accomplishment had the
brigade ever been mobilized. Indeed, in training deployments to
Egypt, Jordan, and Somalia, the personnel had many opportunities
to demonstrate proficiency in projecting stability.
Accordingly, a further step in manning a US contribution to a
deployable NATO police command could be organizing an Army
Reserve or Army National Guard brigade composed of experienced,
component-integrated personnel available on the short notice the
authors have stipulated.
In sum, it is encouraging to read of organizing a deployable
NATO police command, but as the authors noted, it must be
appropriately manned to accomplish its different anticipated
functions and missions. I would like, therefore, to see the authors
consider in more detail who should be in the force’s complement,
with an eye toward integrating members of all US Army components
and even investigating the participation of the other branches of
service in the command.
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W

e agree with Brigadier General Raymond Bell’s
assessment regarding “civilian” policing expertise in the
Army. Much of it is resident in the Reserve components
as there are many civilian police officers serving within the
Reserves and National Guard, however, there are broader issues at
play here.
The United States is not ideal to conduct stability policing
or lead any international police development program. Our
decentralized, US state-centric system does not translate easily
into international operations, notwithstanding one common
denominator among American municipal and state police—their
experience using discretion among civilians in their daily work
practice, something likely not found among many military police
in the active component. A civilian on a military post is quite
different from one in a civilian community as the military has
options to prevent entry and to remove troublesome civilians from
its installations.
In contrast, stability police from gendarmerie-type forces
(GTF), like the Carabinieri, have much longer training and
education programs and they spend their careers in civilian
communities, not on military installations. Further because of
the nature of deployments, especially in recent years, GTF often
have extensive experience in international operations. And they
are police with civilian status and accepted by the United Nations
as police.
In contrast, military police are not recognized by the
United Nations as police for a police component, an important
consideration as NATO missions often transition to UN or similar
police or political-led missions. Similarly, the African Union and
other regional organizations have similar philosophies—the
military are not police. There’s a reason for that. In many countries
in which there are peace operations, security forces have been
(and sometimes are) bad actors, related to a predatory, corrupt
political class that came into power as the result of a coup
supported by the military. The civilian police (clearly delineated
from the military) under civilian control are necessary to build
police institutions that respect the rule of law.
Can military police do stability policing? Absolutely! And we
agree their professionalism goes a long way toward setting the
standard for future policing. But this doesn’t get to the longerterm institution building, built upon a civilian-control model,
accepted by the population as legitimate. At best, military police
can conduct stability policing for basic tasks as we get enough GTF
into the operation to do it. And as the environment stabilizes, the
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long-term development plan should transition supporting police
to the type of police being developed.
The area of detention operations is one in which we believe
military police are best suited to support, if their force structure
allows. The military police, aside from one unfortunate incident
in recent years, are by far the best at detention. The American
Corrections Association’s accrediting of military police-led
detention facilities recognizes this. The rule-bound nature of
detention and the technical competence and professionalism of
military police officers make them a preferred provider of detention
until the capacity to detain prisoners humanely can be built. There
is less risk of disenfranchising the public when providing humane
and transparent detention operations.
History shows that sustainable, civilian-led police institutions
are not built by militaries in a top-down approach. “Militarized”
police development tends to train and equip (it risks making
corrupt police more efficiently corrupt) and misses the necessary
bottom-up institution building necessary for legitimacy.
Additionally, many of our international partners have GTF or
other deployable police assets that can do such policing. This
should also make us pause before the US military provides
any support to civilian police under the auspices of security
cooperation. Do we inadvertently risk delegitimizing the police
when they begin to use military tactics, dress, or act like the
military? We have seen this occur domestically when police adopt
military practices.

